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Abstract
Prior research has often linked anxiety to attentional vigilance for threat using the dot probe task, which presents probes in
spatial locations that were or were not preceded by a putative threat stimulus. The present study investigated the impact of
worry on threat vigilance by administering this task during a worry condition and during a mental arithmetic control
condition to 56 undergraduate students scoring in the low normal range on a measure of chronic worry. The worry
induction was associated with faster responses than arithmetic to probes in the attended location following threat words,
indicating the combined influence of worry and threat in facilitating attention. Within the worry condition, responses to
probes in the attended location were faster for trials containing threat words than for trials with only neutral words, whereas
the converse pattern was observed for responses to probes in the unattended location. This connection between worry
states and attentional capture by threat may be central to understanding the impact of hypervigilance on information
processing in anxiety and its disorders.
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Introduction
Anxiety has been consistently linked theoretically to anticipation
of potential aversive events or ‘threats’ [1–9]. A readiness to
evaluate potential threats in the environment, commonly referred
to as vigilance, suggests an attentional disposition associated with
anxiety. A propensity to evaluate potential threats has been a
useful model to explain physiological findings in anxiety including
amygdala reactivity [10–12], connectivity of the amygdala with
frontal and parietal cortices [13,14], event related brain potentials
[15,16], and probes of the corticospinal motor system [17].
Behaviorally, vigilance has been most often defined by response
times to presentations of threat-relevant stimuli. The dot probe
task is commonly used to study vigilance in anxiety. Trials are
comprised of a pair of words, one of which is followed by a neutral
‘dot’ probe. Threat trials include one threat word and one neutral
word. On neutral trials, both words are neutral. The conventional
analytic approach discards neutral trials and operationalizes threat
vigilance by comparing response times for probes in the same
location as the threat word to response times for probes in the
same location as the neutral word [4,18–23]. Many versions of the
dot probe task have been used to study anxiety with variations
including response type (choice or simple), stimulus type (pictures,
words), stimulus pair locations (top/bottom, left/right, random),
duration of stimulus presentations (subliminal to several seconds),
and whether attention is unrestricted or directed to a particular
stimulus location. A recent meta-analysis of dot probe task studies
encompassing many of these paradigm variations found that both
state and trait anxiety were associated with faster response times
for probes in the same spatial location as previously presented
threat stimuli than for probes in a different spatial location from
the threat stimuli [19].
An alternative measure of threat vigilance compares the presence
of a threat stimulus (trials with one threat word and one neutral
word) to the absence of a threat stimulus (trials where both words
are neutral), irrespective of spatial location [24]. The prediction
here is that anxiety would be associated with faster response times
for probes following displays that include threat stimuli than for
probes following displays that include only neutral stimuli. In the
present study, we tested the sensitivity of both measures of threat
vigilance to a reliable experimental manipulation of worry, an
important form of anxiety with content focused on concerns about
unpleasant scenarios that might occur in the future.
Worry inductions increase reports of anxiety and unpleasant
affect as well as decrease positive affect in clinically anxious patients
and in non-psychiatric control participants [25–27]. Worry has also
been associated with specific physiological profiles, as measured by
electroencephalography [26], electromyography [17], positron
emission tomography [28], and functional magnetic resonance
imaging [29]. Worry states have been theoretically linked to a
pervasive bias for threat detection [30]. Based on evidence that
worry is a similar process for chronic worriers and for people
reporting minimal worry [31,32], it was hypothesized that a worry
induction in non-worriers would facilitate responses to threat on the
dot probe task and that these findings would carry relevance for
conclusions drawn from the dot probe literature in GAD patients
[4,33] and other forms of anxiety [19]. Performance on the dot
probe task has been manipulated in multiple ways [34–36], but this
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anxiety and test the effect on threat vigilance using this task.
In the present study, we induced worry states in participants
reporting typical non-clinical levels of trait worry using a protocol
that has been reliably used to induce worry in anxious and non-
anxious individuals [17,25–27]. For the conventional measure of
threat vigilance using the dot probe task, it was predicted that
worry would result in faster responses than mental arithmetic to
probes in the same attended location as threat words. Mental
arithmetic was selected as a control condition to contrast with the
worry condition because both involve high cognitive load and at
least mild emotional stress but only worry has been theoretically
linked to vigilance for threat [18]. For the alternative measure of
threat vigilance, we predicted that worry would result in faster
responses to probes in the attended location than mental
arithmetic on trials containing threat words, regardless of the
location of the threat word, but not on trials containing only
neutral words.
Methods
Ethics Statement
All participants signed informed consent documents approved
by the institutional review board of the Pennsylvania State
University. Research was conducted according to principles
expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki and as approved by the
institutional review board of the Pennsylvania State University.
Participants
Fifty-six participants (half female) were undergraduate students
at Penn State University in introductory psychology courses (ages
18–28, M=18.75, SD=1.54). All participants were administered
the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) [37], a 16-item
instrument that assesses trait levels of chronic uncontrollable
worry. Participants were selected if their scores on the PSWQ were
between 20 and 50 (M=37.8, SD=7.49). This range was chosen
to represent worry from a non-anxious group that was not likely to
be repressing anxiety or unusually apathetic to worry symptoms.
Participants with a previous history of generalized anxiety
disorder, panic disorder, or other mental illness as determined
by self-report were excluded from this study. Following the
conclusion of the experimental session, participants were given a
debriefing form approved by the Psychology Department and
institutional review board of the Pennsylvania State University.
Materials
A personal computer (Pentium II Processor) running Eprime
stimulus presentation software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.,
Pittsburgh, PA) equipped with a keyboard for participant
responses was used for the dot probe task. Threat trials were
comprised of 96 threat words paired with emotionally neutral
words matched for frequency of English usage and length. All
words were obtained from MacLeod and McLaughlin [38].
Identical to the dot probe task employed by MacLeod et al. [4],
the location of the threat word, its paired neutral word, and the
subsequently presented probe were counterbalanced and random-
ly ordered so that each had equal probability of being in the top or
bottom location on a given trial. Thus, two factors were
independently varied on the threat trials: threat word location
and dot probe location. The combination of these two factors
resulted in four possible response conditions: threat on top with
probe on top, threat on top with probe on bottom, threat on
bottom with probe on bottom, and threat on bottom with probe
on top. Neutral trials were identical in structure to threat trials
except that they were comprised of an additional 96 word pairs
featuring two neutral words. Filler trials were comprised of neutral
word pairs similar to the neutral trials but were not followed by dot
probes. None of the neutral words used for the filler trials were
presented on threat or neutral trials. Presentations of threat,
neutral, and filler trials were randomly ordered.
The words for the threat and neutral trials were divided into two
equivalent lists so that no words were repeated within or across the
worry and arithmetic conditions. All 96 neutral word pairs for the
filler trials were presented for both conditions. Thus, each condition
contained 192 trialsofwordpairs(48threat, 48neutral,and96 filler
trials). The 192 trials for each condition were presented in 24 blocks
of 8 trials (6 blocks each for threat and neutral trials, and 12 blocks
for filler trials). Each word pair was presented on the screen for
500 ms, with words presented in black capital letters, 18 mm high.
On threat and neutral trials, an asterisk (the dot probe) appeared in
place of one of the two words and remained on the screen until a
response (pressing the space bar) had been made, at which point the
next pair followed after a 1s delay. On filler trials, subsequent word
pairs were presented after a 1s delay.
Procedure
After signing the consent form, participants were asked to think
of a worry topic of current concern to them that they could worry
intensely about for several minutes total during the course of the
experiment. Our and others’ work have repeatedly established that
this type of worry induction reliably facilitates future-oriented,
anxious thoughts that are both unpleasant and engrossing for non-
anxious individuals as well as for those meeting criteria for
affective disorders [17,25–27,35]. All participants confirmed that
they were able to generate worry topics of current concern.
Participants were then seated at a fixed distance from the
computer screen to ensure that the distance between words on
the vertical axis was less than 2 degrees of visual angle. The
following instructions were presented on the screen:
In this experiment you are going to see words presented on
the screen in pairs. One word will appear just above the
center of the screen, and one just below. Please read the top
word of each pair aloud as soon as it appears. Sometimes
when the two words disappear an asterisk (*) will remain
either in the area where the top word appeared or in the
area where the bottom word appeared. When you see this
asterisk, press the space bar as quickly as possible.
Participants completed a short practice session featuring twelve
trials (using words not employed in the main experiment). By the
end of the practice session, all participants were able to
appropriately respond when probes were presented and withhold
responses when probes were not presented. The experimenter
confirmed consistent attention by participants to the top word via
monitoring of participants’ verbal responses. During the practice
session, the experimenter remained in the room to answer any
questions about instructions presented on the screen and to
monitor accuracy on practice trials.
Following the practice session, participants began one of two
conditions, the order of which was counterbalanced across
participants. In one experimental condition, participants were
asked to worry, using the following instructions on the screen:
Now we would like you to worry about the topic that you
chose earlier in the experiment. Please worry about this
Worry and Attention to Threat
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worry, until you are asked to stop worrying. After a short
period of worrying, the experimenter will resume the same
experiment you have been working on thus far.
In the other condition, participants were asked to engage in
mental arithmetic, using the following instructions on the screen:
For a short period, we would like you to do a mental
subtraction in your head. At the end of this period, we will
ask for the number you were last on. The number to start on
is 1,320 and we would like you to subtract 7 from this
number again and again in your head until we ask you to
stop doing the subtraction. If you forget the number you
were last on, think back to the last number you remember
and continue subtracting.
Each set of instructions was presented on the screen for as long
as the participant needed to read it (approximately 30 s). In
between each block of 8 trials, participants were presented with
instructions on the screen to either ‘‘continue worrying’’ or
‘‘continue subtracting.’’ These instructions remained on the screen
for 30 s and were immediately followed by the next block of 8
trials. Our hypotheses concerned the effects of worry compared to
mental arithmetic on the dot probe task, which was our behavioral
measure of threat vigilance. Having the inductions and dot probe
blocks contiguous in time without breaks for assessing affective self-
report influences of the inductions was essential for maintaining
the carry over effects of the inductions to the threat vigilance task.
At the conclusion of the experimental runs, participants were given
a debriefing form and any questions were answered.
Data Analysis
Probe detection latencies of less than 100 ms (premature
responses) and greater than 3000 ms (delayed or missed responses)
occurred on 1% of the trials and were excluded from analyses.
Mean response times for each condition and trial type were
calculated for each participant separately. To test the alternative
operationalization of threat vigilance comparing the presence of a
threat stimulus (trials with one threat word and one neutral word) to
the absence of a threat stimulus (trials with two neutral words),
threat-related facilitation of reaction times was assessed by an
omnibus Condition (worry, arithmetic) 6 Probe Location (top,
bottom) 6 Trial Type (threat, neutral only) repeated-measures
ANOVA and appropriateposthoc analyses. Note that Threat Word
Location (top, bottom) cannot be included as a factor in this
omnibus analysis because neutral only trials for the Trial Type
factor do not include threat words. The conventional operationa-
lizationof threat vigilance used inprior research usingthe dot probe
task was tested by a Condition(worry, arithmetic)6Probe Location
(top, bottom) 6 Threat Word Location (top, bottom) repeated-
measures ANOVA on the threat trials. Pearson’s product moment
correlations assessed associations among performance metrics and
PSWQ scores. Two-tailed tests were used throughout. Cohen’s
d statistic for effect sizes was computed for individual contrasts [39].
Results
For the omnibus ANOVA, significant main effects were found
for Condition, F(1,55)=7.75, p,0.01, and for Probe Location,
F(1,55)=53.80, p,0.001. Worry was associated with faster
response times compared to mental arithmetic, and probes
presented in the top (attended) location were responded to faster
than those in the bottom location (Table 1). Central to study
hypotheses, there was a Condition6Probe Location6Trial Type
interaction, F(1,55)=27.72, p,0.001 (Figure 1). No other main
effects or interactions were significant for the omnibus ANOVA.
For the Condition 6Probe Location 6Threat Word Location
ANOVA on threat trials, main effects were observed for Condition,
F(1,55)=7.92, p,0.01, and for Probe Location, F(1,55)=43.82,
p,0.001. As for the omnibus ANOVA above, worry was associated
with faster response times than arithmetic, and probes presented in
the top location were responded to faster than probes in the bottom
location. There was also a main effect of Threat Word Location,
indicating that threat words presented in the top (attended) location
were followed by faster responses to subsequent probes than threat
words presented in the bottom (unattended) location, regardless of
probe location, F(1,55)=7.64, p,0.01. A Condition6Probe
Location interaction, F(1,55)=14.24, p,0.001, for this ANOVA
on threat trials qualified the 3-way interaction described above for
the omnibus ANOVA. As hypothesized for the alternative
operationalization of threat vigilance, worry was associated with
faster response times than arithmetic to probes in the attended
location, regardless of whether the threat word was presented in the
attended or unattended location, t(55)=3.54, p,0.001, d=0.77
(Figure 1). For probes in the unattended location, there was no
significant difference between the conditions, t(55)=0.94, p=0.35,
d=0.12. The response times to probes in the attended location for
worry were also faster than to probes in the unattended location for
either worry, t(55)=6.50, p,0.001, d=0.44, or arithmetic,
t(55)=5.45, p,0.001, d=0.50. No other effects were significant,
including the Condition6Threat Word Location6Probe Location
interaction, F(1,55)=3.14, p=0.25, which serves as the test of the
conventional operationalization of threat vigilance positing faster
responses to probes in the same attended location as threat words
[4,33]. The absence of this interaction also indicated that worry was
not associated with difficulty disengaging attention from threat.
The Condition 6 Probe Location ANOVA on neutral trials
revealed the same Condition and Probe Location main effects
indicating that worry was associated with quicker responsetimes than
arithmetic, F(1,55)=6.11, p,0.05, and that probes presented in the
top location were responded to faster than probes in the bottom
location, F(1,55)=19.57, p,0.001. The critical Condition6Probe
Location interaction was also significant, F(1,55)=19.77, p,0.001.
As hypothesized for the alternative operationalization of threat
Table 1. Response times to probes following either worry
induction or mental arithmetic.
Threat Word Location on Threat
Trials
Probe Location Top Bottom Neutral Trials
Worry
Top 494.74 (117.67) 488.44 (125.33) 513.07 (96.86)
Bottom 529.70 (108.26) 548.36 (123.75) 515.36 (109.23)
Mental Arithmetic
Top 521.70 (106.04) 532.93 (96.21) 513.11 (91.89)
Bottom 533.86 (98.21) 559.99 (112.33) 553.77 (100.98)
Mean response times and standard deviations (in parentheses) to probes are
shown as a function of trial type (threat, neutral), threat word location (top,
bottom), probe location (top, bottom), and condition (worry, mental
arithmetic). ‘Threat trials’ include one threat word and one neutral word;
‘neutral trials’ include two neutral words and no threat word.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013411.t001
Worry and Attention to Threat
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above for threat trials were not present for neutral trials, t(55)=0.00,
p=0.997, d=0.00 (Figure 1). Instead, the response times to probes in
the unattended location for arithmetic were slower than for worry,
t(55)=4.11, p,0.001, d=0.36, and were slower than to probes in the
attended location for either worry, t(55)=4.63, p,0.001, d=0.40, or
arithmetic, t(55)=5.31, p,0.001, d=0.42. No other effects were
observed for trials with only neutral words.
Study hypotheses were also supported by ancillary pairwise
comparisons for key contrasts. The worry condition was associated
with faster responses to probes in the attended location for threat than
neutral trials, t(55)=3.10, p,0.005, d=0.19 (Figure 1A). The
opposite was observed for the unattended location, with the worry
condition accompanied by slower responses for threat than neutral
trials, t(55)=3.92, p,0.001, d=0.23 (Figure 1B). In contrast, mental
arithmetic was accompanied by slower response times to probes in
the attended location for threat than neutral trials, t(55)=22.34,
p,0.05, d=0.15 (Figure 1A), and there was no difference for probes
in the unattended location, t(55)=1.20, p=0.24,d=0.07(Figure1B).
As done in prior studies using the dot probe task [4,20,33,40–41],
an attention bias index was computed as the difference between
responses to attended and unattended threat word locations
(average difference between matched and non-matched threat/
probe locations). The worry and arithmetic conditions were not
significantly different for this bias index, t(55)=0.56, p=0.58. In
addition, the PSWQ was not correlated with this bias index (Worry
condition: r=0.11, p=0.40; Math condition: r=0.03, p=0.81;
overall: r=0.11, p=0.44) or other related metrics of behavioral
performance (e.g. Worry condition for matched threat and probe
locations: r=0.09, p=0.50; Worry condition for threat trials:
r=0.08, p=0.58; Math-Worry for threat trials: r=0.08, p=0.56).
There were also no gender differences for the PSWQ or the above
behavioral measures (all ps.0.27).
Discussion
The dot probe is widely regarded as a definitive behavioral task
for detecting threat vigilance associated with anxiety. The
traditional analysis strategy for this task compares response times
when threat stimuli and probes are in the same spatial location to
response times when the threat and probe are in different spatial
locations. Our contention is that the comparison of trials
containing threat stimuli to trials that do not include threat
stimuli is a relatively untapped resource [24,41] for understanding
how the mere presence of threat may influence behavior. This
expanded analysis strategy is consistent with theoretical models of
anxiety which have emphasized the link between anxiety and
attunement to potential threats in the environment. In the present
study, we found that comparing trials with threat words to trials
with only neutral words was sensitive to the detection of a threat
bias for the anxiety condition (worry induction), whereas the
conventional analysis strategy analyzing matches in threat and
probe locations for trials with threat words was not. The presence
of a threat word, whether in the attended or unattended location,
was followed by faster responses to a probe in the attended
location during the worry condition than during the mental
arithmetic control condition. Moreover, within the worry
condition, responses were faster to probes in the attended location
than to probes in the unattended location, whereas no differences
were observed for the mental arithmetic condition. These results
suggest that the act of worrying is sufficient to facilitate an
attentional bias to threat and enhances the beneficial effects of
attention to a particular spatial location.
Initial findings by MacLeod et al. [4] suggested that the location
of the threat word in the attended location is critical, whereas
findings here indicate that the mere presence of threat in either the
attended or unattended location affects subsequent behavioral
responses. Comparisons of threat and neutral trials are not typically
reported in dot probe studies, but such comparisons bolster claims
regarding the impact of threaton behavior [24]. Theories of anxiety
[1–5,7–9,32] and worry [25,42] suggest that vigilance is a key factor
in anxiety pathology, consistent with evidence across a range of
physiological indicators [12,17,26,29,43–44]. Alternatively, others
have argued that a difficultytodisengageattentionfrom threatisthe
aspect of attention [45] that is likely to be biased in anxiety and
worry [24,46–48]. The facilitated responses for the combination of
Figure 1. Response times to probes.Response times toprobes followingword pair presentationsthat either included a threat word (Threat)ordidnot
include a threat word (Neutral). Graphs illustrate response times to probes in the attended (A) and unattended (B) locations following worry inductions or
following mental arithmetic. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals [73] around the means after adjusting for between-subject variance [74]. *p,0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013411.g001
Worry and Attention to Threat
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rather than disengagement aspects of attention [45]. Specifically,
vigilance was indicated by worry being accompanied by faster
responses to probes in the attended location following threat words
in either spatial location. Disengagement, on the other hand, would
be indicated by worry being accompanied by slower responses to
probes in a different location than the threat word, which was not
found. The dot probe task may be particularly sensitive to the
impact of a recent worry experience on vigilance, extending prior
researchshowingtheinfluenceofworryonsubsequent processingin
other domains [32,49–51]. Assuming that anxious individuals and
especially GAD patients may regularly experience worry, our dot
probe findings indicate that these frequent experiences of worry
may directly contribute to preferential vigilance for threat cues in
the environment for these individuals.
Complementing speeded responses to the attended location
following threat words for the worry condition, we also found that
worry was accompanied by slower responses to probes in the
unattended location when following a threat word than when only
neutral words were presented. This slowing is consistent with prior
research documenting interference from worry on subsequent
processing of unrelated material [27,49]. However, given that the
threat word location did not qualify this slowing, findings here do
not support specific disengagement failures associated with
anxiety, as noted above. A different pattern was observed for
mental arithmetic, with slower responses to probes in the attended
location when following a threat word than when only neutral
words were presented (and no response differences for the
unattended location). This perhaps reflects a lack of congruence
between mental arithmetic and threat processing, as opposed to
the congruence between worry and threat processing. In support
of this interpretation, lack of congruence in emotional content is
associated with slower response times and poorer accuracy than
processing congruent information [52]. Alternatively, the degree of
carry over influence from the worry induction could have been
higher than from the mental arithmetic manipulation, potentially
resulting in effects diminishing more rapidly for the arithmetic
condition than for the worry condition.
GAD patients typically have slower response times overall
compared to individuals with no psychiatric diagnosis [4,33],
whereas worry here was associated with faster response times than
mental arithmetic collapsing across threat and neutral trials.
Slowed responses in GAD patients may be related to general
problems with sustained attention in clinical populations or with
the interference of comorbid depression on dot probe performance
[53, see also 54]. In a dot probe experiment, McKay [55] found
that chronic worriers not drawn from a clinical population made
faster responses overall than non-worriers. In addition, across both
groups, a pattern of faster response times for threat than neutral
trials was observed following worry induction, as confirmed here,
but speeded responses did not follow a positive mood induction.
Accordingly, we predict that our findings will most likely extend to
populations who have high levels of chronic worry but who present
with few confounding additional factors (e.g., medication, co-
morbid depression).
Along these lines, the present results are not likely due to the
influence of depression or other forms of negative affect that co-
occur with worry [4,22,33,56–60]. Depression typically has not
been associated with an attentional bias for threat [4,56,61–62].
Self-report measures of state and trait anxiety that psychometric
studies have demonstrated are primarily indicators of negative
affect [63,64] are uncorrelated with dot probe performance
[18,33,34]. The PSWQ in the present study was also not
correlated with measures of threat vigilance, indicating that
behavior may yield evidence of threat vigilance not effectively
assessed by common self-report measures. The specificity of worry
inductions for promoting threat vigilance should be assessed in
future studies by comparisons to other inductions (e.g., fear, anger,
sadness) and measures (e.g., cognitive flexibility, emotion regula-
tion). We did not assess self-report influences at the conclusion of
induction/dot probe blocks given the unreliability of retrospective
rather than experiential reports of affect [65]. However, the
average response time differences across tasks provided evidence of
vigilance according to our manipulations, and future research may
uncover an appropriate instrument to tap the experiential
correlates of these effects.
Interestingly, the causal flow of worry leading to increases in
threat vigilance may be reversible. Evidence suggests that training
high worriers to attend to nonthreatening words reduces negative
thought intrusions during worry [66]. Similarly, focusing on
benign meanings of potentially aversive information reduces
negative thought intrusions and anxiety in high worriers [67,68].
Manipulating dot probe stimulus probe contingencies so that
probes replace neutral words on 90–100% of trials has been shown
to reduce threat biases and decreased anxiety symptoms in chronic
worriers [69] and GAD patients [70]. A valuable future study
bridging the present study with these recent findings for attention
training and modification could test whether similar strategies
mitigate the effects found here for worry induction.
The specificity of the behavioral findings for the worry
induction provides evidence for how worry affects behavior.
However, additional measures could enrich our understanding of
the mechanisms and effects of the worry inductions. For example,
assessing worry induction success and the degree of distress caused
by the worry might inform how worry influences subsequent
attention. Similarly, physiological data such as autonomic
reactivity would provide valuable complementary understanding
of the worry process and subsequent behavioral effects. Future
research is also needed to determine whether findings for worry
here extend to other versions of the dot probe task, such as those
using pictures instead of words, different stimulus locations and
durations, stimulus discrimination rather that stimulus localization,
and unrestricted attention rather than instructions to attend to a
particular location. In particular, directing attention to the top
location in the present study might have interfered with the
previously reported effects comparing matched and non-matched
threat/probe spatial locations.
Our study design and findings bypass three criticisms that have
been leveled at previous dot probe studies. One criticism is that
although the verbal modality may be ideally suited to study anxiety
[25,58], anxious individuals may be more facile with threat words
than non-anxious individuals, yielding a potential confound in
using these words to study group differences for threat vigilance
[71]. In this study, only non-anxious participants were included,
and anxiety was manipulated on a within-subjects basis. Second,
reliability concerns pertaining to the use of the dot probe task in
non-clinical populations were obviated by experimental manipu-
lations that affect attentional vigilance in a state-dependent
manner, as shown here and elsewhere [36,72]. Third, the
traditional dot probe task used in this study does not guarantee
that attention will stay on the presented words in the attended
location for the full 500-ms durations [46,58]. Findings here do
not depend on attention remaining fixed on the presented words in
the attended location, given that the presence of a threat word in
either location influenced response times. Future research could
add to the present findings by using eyetracking measures to
explore the influence of worry on maintaining overt visual
attention to threat stimuli while they are presented.
Worry and Attention to Threat
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task to investigate threat vigilance associated with anxiety by
highlighting the specific contribution of worry states to vigilance
for threat. Comparisons between worry and a mental arithmetic
control condition as well as comparisons between trials with threat
words and trials with only neutral words point to the influence of
the combination of worry and threat on behavior. Present findings
suggest that the confluence of worry and threat is instrumental in
creating an attentional bias to threat similar to findings from
studies of state and trait anxiety including GAD. Frequent, long-
lasting worry states in clinical populations may contribute to
patterns of hypervigilance in these individuals. Psychotherapy
techniques that focus on reducing worries would thus be expected
to mitigate the vigilance and preferential attention to threat that
characterize GAD and other forms of anxiety.
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